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Abstract 
 
Social information ‘nudges’ concerning how others perform typically boost 
individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. 
However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several 
such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple 
group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to 
average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. 
Between-group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, 
because the boost is largest among the pre-‘nudge’ very poor performers. Finally, 
the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their 
group affiliations.  
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1. Introduction    
People often respond positively to information about the performance of others in real effort 
task experiments (e.g. see Falk and Ichino, 2006, Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Azmat and 
Iriberri, 2010). The provision of such information has, as a result, become a popular 
candidate public policy ’nudge’ (see Sunstein and Thaler, 2008, and Halpern, 2015). The 
evidence, however, typically comes from experiments where there is one reference group 
and, in natural settings, there are often several. We consider whether this difference matters. 
In particular, we report on a real effort task experiment where there are two, exclusive group 
reference points: one refers to the performance of the subject’s own group and the other 
refers to that of another group.1 This enables us to consider 3 questions where the existing 
evidence is negligible or inconclusive. 
I. Does the boost to average individual performance when there is a single group 
reference point generalise to where there are two such reference points? 
II. How does the provision of multiple group reference points affect the level of 
inequality both between individuals and between groups? 
III. Does the mechanism for generating individual group affiliation affect the 
influence of multiple group reference points on performance?  
The first question is important because there are reasons for supposing that the influence of 
social comparison is more complicated in multiple than single group settings. For instance, 
there is not only the difference between an individual and his or her group’s behaviour 
(‘within-group’); there is also the difference between the individual’s group and the other 
group (‘between-group’). The dilemma over whether it is better to be a ‘big fish in a small 
pond or a small fish in a big pond’ suggests both types of social comparison might motivate 
individuals. If the existence of several group references complicates social comparison in this 
                                                        
1 There are many experiments with multiple groups that have focused on how group membership affects 
strategic behaviour in interactions between members of different groups (see Ball et al, 2001). But to our 
knowledge, there seem to be virtually none that are concerned with how information about other groups’ 
performance (as well as one’s own) motivates behaviour in what is in other respects a non-strategic setting. 
Grossman and Komai (2013) provide an unusual recent example where there are two such groups, but they 
study a slightly different question with respect to envy. There are a rich and a poor group, each has its own 
hierarchy of earnings and taken together they establish the overall (society) hierarchy of earnings. They are 
concerned with whether subjects envy those who are better off within their group and/or within the society as a 
whole. They find evidence of both but within group envy is the most powerful.  
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and possibly other ways, then it may, in turn, alter how the provision of such group reference 
points affects behaviour. 
This would not matter if there were only ever single reference groups but many social 
information policy ‘nudges’ naturally occur in multiple group settings. A popular public 
policy in education, for instance, is to provide league table information on individual school 
performance in standardised tests. This supplies the students (and teachers) in each school 
with both an own group reference point and also a reference point with respect to how other 
groups perform. The insight of Azmat and Iriberri (2010) suggests that own group 
information in isolation boosts educational performance, but does the same occur with the 
provision of league table information when this own group information is coupled with 
information about the performance of other groups? This is, in effect, our first question.   
The answer to it also has a potentially wider significance for policy evaluation: for example 
the assessment of policies that involve introducing consumer choice into the provision of 
public services like education and health. This is because, while these policies are typically 
introduced because such choice creates a market-like pressure to improve the service, they 
are also accompanied by the provision of information on different providers’ performance 
(i.e. a social information ‘nudge’). However, if multiple group social information ‘nudges’ 
per se  boost performance, then this needs to be taken into account when evaluating such 
consumer choice policies. It is possible, for instance, that much of the gain could arise from 
the social information ‘nudge’ and not the pressure of the market. 
Our second question is important because policy makers are commonly concerned with how 
interventions affect both output and the level of inequality in society. There is mixed 
evidence on this from the single group experiments. In most studies, everyone’s performance 
improves (e.g. Azmat and Iriberri, 2010), but in others there is also convergence of individual 
behaviour on the group reference point (see Abeler et al, 2011), in part because the boost in 
performance is largely among those performing below the norm (see Mas and Moretti, 
2009).2 Both responses are understandable depending on whether the provision of own group 
information triggers competitive or norm-conforming preferences. Since the presence of two 
                                                        
2 And in others there is no effect at all (see Eriksson et al, 2009). A further reason for tentativeness in 
summarising the literature is that studies like Falk and Ichino, 2006, and Azmat and Iriberri, 2012, are between 
subject designs and do not readily allow a test for whether some subject groups are more inclined to respond to 
group reference points than others. Our within subject design facilitates such tests. 
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exclusive groups might as easily prime competitive instincts as those of group conformism, it 
is an open question how the balance between these two motives will be affected.  
Groups are also often hierarchically differentiated by their performance (as in school league 
tables or differences between natural groups) and policy makers can be interested in how 
interventions affect group differences as much as individual ones. This introduces a further 
dimension to our first two questions: that is, are the effects of social comparison on behaviour 
the same for members of the ‘high’ performing group as for those in the ‘low’ performing 
one?  
Finally when there is more than one group, the issue arises as to how individuals become 
affiliated with one rather than another. Our third question follows from this. It is important 
for public policy reasons both for anticipating the effects of policy and in guiding policy, 
where this is possible, over how group affiliation occurs. For example, to return to the policy 
of providing school league table information, do the effects of this public policy depend on 
whether the allocation of individuals to schools is random or through parental/individual 
choice? If they do, then an important additional dimension of policy may be the mechanism 
for allocating individuals to schools.      
We discuss the background to these questions in more detail in the next section. Section 3 
explains the experimental design. Section 4 gives the results. We find that the provision of 
multiple group reference points boosts almost everyone’s performance and that it tends to 
reduce the variance in performance because the boost is biggest for those, who in the absence 
of group references, are the very worst performers. There are no significant differences in 
either of these respects between those in the High group and those in the Low one. Thus, the 
provision of multiple group reference points raises average performance, it has no effect on 
between-group inequality and reduces within-group inequality. In short, this is a ‘nudge’ that 
raises performance without incurring any cost in terms of increasing inequality; indeed it 
lowers inequality in one dimension. We find that the biggest boost to performance occurs 
when group affiliation is freely chosen; and the weakest effects on performance and on 
inequality occur when group affiliation arises from a mechanism of delegated choice. Section 
5 discusses the results and we conclude in Section 6. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Social comparison with single and multiple group reference points 
There are a variety of explanations for why social comparison within a group might motivate 
individuals in a single group setting. They can be broadly divided into two according to their 
implication for individual behaviour (and hence behaviour in the aggregate). First, there are 
preference-based arguments for social comparison that predict a boost in everyone’s efforts. 
For instance, people may have competitive preferences: they like to do better than others. 
They may just like winning (see Parco et al., 2005 and Sheremeta, 2010 on this in contests), 
or they may value the status that comes from visibly being better than others (e.g. see 
Charness et al., 2013). They may alternatively have a preference for self-esteem and 
judgments regarding self-worth often depend on a similar kind of relative comparison for 
epistemic reasons. In each case, in addition to whatever material return comes from 
performance, people also gain some extra psychological benefits when there is social 
information and this boosts everyone’s performance. 3  Aggregate performance therefore 
increases, but there is no clear effect on the variance of individual performances within the 
group.  
 
Second, there are norm-based arguments for social comparison that predict behaviour will 
converge on the norm. The desire to conform to a norm may arise from ‘group-think’ type 
social pressure within the group or because conformity enables a person to identify more 
strongly with his or her group (e.g. see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, in the economics 
literature; and Asch, 1951, for some famous early psychological experiments on such 
tendencies to conformism). Those who would otherwise do better than the norm, ease back in 
this case; and those who would lag behind the norm, redouble their efforts to catch up. The 
impact of social information on overall performance is, thus, unclear. The clear effect is on 
the variance in performance: it should fall with social comparison on this account.  
 
The evidence from single group reference point experiments on which type of motive best 
explains the ‘within-group’ effect on behaviour is mixed (e.g. see Azmat and Iriberri, 2010, 
                                                        
3 Azmat and Iriberri (2010) offer a different information-based account of the influence that relative information 
has on behaviour by applying what they refer to as ‘self-perception theory’ in relation to individual ability. On 
this account, information about average performance boosts (lowers) performance of those above (below) the 
reference point and so stretches the distribution of performances. They find no evidence of this and neither do 
we.   
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Abeler et al., 2011, Falk and Ichino, 2006, and Mas and Moretti, 2009). The provision of 
multiple group reference points could also play into this debate over the ‘within-group’ effect 
in conflicting ways.  For instance, it might be argued that the contrast that is made possible 
when there are two groups (and there is exclusive membership of one or the other) primes 
norm guided behaviour because any deviation from a group norm may now be associated 
with membership of another group. Alternatively, if the two groups appear in competition (as 
they are perhaps more likely to when they are stratified into ‘high’ and ‘low’ groups), then 
perhaps within-group competitiveness will be primed.  
 
In addition, the presence of multiple group references introduces the possibility of another 
type of social comparison effect on behaviour: a ‘between-group’ comparison effect (see 
Frank, 1985).4 Again, there are conflicting intuitions over such an effect. For example, it is 
possible that individuals may identify more strongly with a ‘high’ performing group than 
with a ‘low’ performing one because membership of ‘high’ group conveys status. So, 
whatever are the effects of social comparison, they are felt more keenly in the ‘high’ than in 
the ‘low’ performing group. This will be reinforced if those in the ‘low’ group suffer any 
form of discouragement. Alternatively those in the ‘low’ group may be spurred into special 
efforts because they are ‘underdogs’ and the gap between the groups may narrow.  
 
With an array of conflicting arguments and intuitions of this kind and, since it matters 
whether a policy of providing group reference points either boosts performance and/or 
reduces inequality, this is an important matter for empirical determination. 5  This is the 
motivation behind our first two questions. 
 
 
                                                        
4 Also see Falk and Knell (2004) who develop a model where people select their reference point and 
argue that there are two similar considerations in such a choice: self enhancement (which comes in 
these terms from being a big fish in small pond) and self improvement (which comes from being in a 
big pond).  
5 It is perhaps worth emphasising that although we are interested in such disputes over the psychology of social 
comparison, we are not primarily interested in deciding between them here. Our primary concern is with how 
multiple group reference points affect behaviour. It is enough for us that there are such debates so as to render 
this a plausible (and interesting) open theoretical question that can therefore be usefully examined empirically.  
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2.2 Group affiliation mechanism 
Once there is more than one group reference point, the question arises as to how people 
become attached to one rather than another and whether this influences the effect of social 
information ‘nudges’. This is our third research question.  
The mechanism of affiliation might matter because there is some evidence from single group 
reference points that people are more likely to be influenced when they identify more closely 
with their group (see Charness et al., 2013). People may identify more closely with their 
group when they share more things in common with other group members. They may also 
identify more closely for this and other reasons when their group affiliation has been chosen 
by themselves (as compared with being settled by someone else or through the throw of a 
die). While this is a powerful intuition in liberal societies where freedom of choice is highly 
valued (and see Page et al, 2005, for experimental support), it is not the only one.6 For 
example, identity that turns on ethnicity, race or gender is also important in many liberal 
democratic societies but is not chosen. There is also the thought that if people choose their 
group for the maximum advantage this gives for social comparison, the self-serving nature of 
the group choice may in turn undermine its psychological power. This motivates our third 
question: it is an open question because there is no direct experimental evidence and, again, 
there are conflicting intuitions. 
3. Experimental design 
3.1 Design overview 
Individuals in the experiment engage in a real effort task twice, first as isolated (as explained 
below) individuals with no social information (Task 1) and then as isolated individuals but 
with group reference point(s) (Task 2). At the beginning of Task 2, individuals receive one or 
two group reference point(s): they always know the performance of the group to which they 
are affiliated and, when there are two groups, they also know the other group’s performance 
level. The comparison of performance between Task 1 and Task 2 (after controlling for 
learning/boredom) is, therefore, designed to reveal the influence, if any, of group reference 
point(s) on behaviour.  
                                                        
6 The impact of different rules of how groups can be formed endogenously – affecting two groups (insiders and 
outsiders) has also been analysed in the context of provision behaviour in public good games (Ahn et al., 2008; 
2009). 
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We then study whether this group reference point influence depends a) on whether there are 
one or two groups (Question I), and when there are two, b) whether inequality between 
individuals and groups changes as a result of this influence (Question II) and c) whether this 
influence depends on the mechanism generating group affiliation (Question III). We do this 
by having five different Treatments. Individuals in the Baseline Treatment have a single 
group reference point in Task 2: their own. It may be a High or a Low reference point. This is 
determined randomly, but there is always only one.7 In Treatments 1-4, there are two group 
reference points in task 2: the individual’s own group and that of the other group. One of 
these is a High reference point and the other is a Low reference point. Treatments 1-4 are 
distinguished by the procedure for generating group affiliation in Task 2 to either the High or 
the Low group. 
Treatment 1 (Random) randomly allocates individuals to the two groups. This is designed to 
capture group affiliations that arise naturally. It also provides the appropriate comparison for 
behaviour in the Baseline (one group reference point) to address Question I. In Treatments 2-
4, subjects select their groups (i.e. whether it is High or Low). In Treatment 2 (Free choice), 
subjects choose their group. They do the same in Treatment 3 (Paid Choice) but in addition 
they have to pay a fee (the same for both High and Low groups) to affiliate with a group. We 
modify Free Choice in this way because it is often argued that the introduction of a small 
cash nexus is enough to alter the relationship people have to each other (see Vohs et al. 
2006).  While subjects directly choose their group in Treatments 2 and 3, in Treatment 4 
(Delegation) subjects indirectly choose their affiliation. They choose someone who will select 
a group on their behalf. This kind of delegated choice is of course common when there is a 
social process of representative decision making (e.g. as in representative democracies) but it 
might also be plausibly thought to capture the social process governing workplace decisions 
in many market settings (e.g. a worker chooses an employer and the employer then has the 
managerial power to control/order and so makes decisions for the worker).  
Our two group reference points are mutually exclusive. This was a design choice that echoes 
the way, for example, that one is either an immigrant or one is not; one is Italian or one is not; 
one is in the top or the bottom set for maths, one cannot be in both.  
                                                        
7 We have another baseline control treatment where there are no groups. This provides a check on whether any 
increase in performance in task 2 in these group treatments is due to a between task learning/boredom effect 
(rather than a continuous boredom/learning effect) and/or a simple desire to improve individual performance 
(rather than one that is triggered by social comparison).   
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The group reference points are ‘minimal’ in the sense that the affiliation to groups occurs in 
the experiment. This was another design choice. We made it for two reasons. First, using pre-
existing or natural groups complicates the interpretation of the results because they may 
depend on the specificities of the group. Second, minimal group affiliation enables us to 
study the possible influence of different mechanisms for group affiliation.  
3.2 Experiment details 
A key feature of our design is the control for group reference points. We inform subjects 
about the performance level of the group to which they are affiliated in the Baseline and of 
the two groups in Treatments 1-4 and we want subjects to take these group reference points 
as given. Towards this end, we ran several sessions, each of which involved 28 to 34 subjects 
making individual choices in isolation. To ensure that subjects did not perceive any group 
affiliation with those in the laboratory, we recruited subjects to arrive at the experimental lab 
in 10-minute intervals. Once subjects arrived, they were individually seated at a computer 
and they could begin the experiment immediately; and when a subject finished the 
experiment, he/she could leave immediately.  
Once seated, a subject read instructions at his/her computer. Subjects were informed that they 
would perform a set of independent tasks and that instructions for each task would be 
presented just prior to that task. 8 The first task was the slider task of Gill and Prowse (2012) 
where the subject is presented a screen with 48 sliders that can take values from 0 to 100. The 
task is to position each slider at exactly 50 using the computer mouse. We selected the Gill 
and Prowse task because there is no prior evidence of significant time trends in performance 
on this task (due to learning or boredom) that might otherwise render the interpretation of any 
change in performance between task 1 and 2 difficult. Subjects could work on the first task 
for a total of 16 minutes, with a new screen of 48 sliders being presented every two minutes. 
At any point, the subject could also decide to stop working on this task and to move on to the 
next task by clicking a button at the bottom of the screen. At all times, subjects could see the 
total number of sliders they had positioned correctly. Subjects accumulated earnings for the 
total number of sliders correctly positioned at 50 (before moving on to Task 2) at a piece rate 
of 5 points per slider. To ensure understanding, subjects answered control questions and 
participated in a non-incentivised two-minute practice round before beginning Task 1. 
                                                        
8 Independent of each other and for the first four tasks, they were independent of any other participant.  
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The second task was the same as Task 1: that is, 16 minutes of the slider task at the same 
piece rate. However, before Task 2, subjects were given information on the performance of 
people at an earlier date. In the Baseline they were either told that members of their affiliated 
group had in the past either performed at a mean number of 171 or 108 sliders positioned at 
50 in 16 minutes.9 In the Treatments 1-4, subjects were told that they would be affiliated with 
either a High performance or Low performance group, where again the mean number of 
sliders positioned at 50 in 16 minutes in these groups were 171 and 108 respectively. The 
mechanism for affiliation was then described and varied across the Treatments 1-4 in the 
manner set out above (also see below). Thereafter Task 2 is identical to Task 1. So, group 
affiliation had no payoff implications. Before proceeding, subjects had to answer control 
questions, including questions that tested their understanding that group affiliation had no 
pay-off implications.  
The only detail to add about the mechanisms for group affiliation is that in Paid Choice, 
subjects had to pay a fee of 100 points for their choice. This fee had to be paid regardless of 
which group they chose, so that the size of the fee itself would not influence the choice. The 
only difference from Free Choice is the introduction of a cash nexus. In the Delegation 
treatment subjects nominated one of four previous participants, identified only by a number, 
to choose a group for them. Subjects were only informed that each of these four participants 
had taken part earlier and had made a choice of group in the past.10 Whichever previous 
participant was nominated by the subject, his/her choice would be implemented for the 
subject.  
The third, fourth and fifth tasks were designed to complement the normal demographic 
information that is used as controls in individual level regressions. The third was a series of 
incentivised lottery choices intended to measure subjects’ risk aversion in the gain and loss 
                                                        
9 Prior to running our main experimental treatments, we ran two sessions where 62 subjects performed just the 
slider task for up to 30 minutes in place of Task 1 and Task 2. The rest of the tasks they performed were the 
same as the ones described above. The mean number of sliders positioned correctly in the last 16 minutes by the 
top and bottom halves were, respectively, 171 and 108. There was no evidence of significant time trends in the 
performance of this task.  
10  Our aim was to generate an equal probability of being assigned to the high as the low group under 
‘Delegation’ so that it was comparable in this respect to ‘Random’. We asked randomly chosen participants 
from our preliminary sessions (where, recall, subjects performed only the task with no group affiliation for up to 
30 minutes) a non-incentivised hypothetical question after the experiment concerning whether they would 
choose to affiliate with a High or Low performance group. After 4 such decisions, we achieved a set such that 
there was 50-50 probability of being High/Low and so these 4 became the set of delegated choosers in the 
‘Delegation’ treatment.   
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domains, ambiguity aversion and conformism (Holt and Laury 2002). The fourth task was not 
incentivized and subjects received a fixed payment of 100 points for answering a hypothetical 
question intended to capture his/her degree of self-serving bias (see Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997). The fifth task was the Arad and Rubinstein (2012) incentivised level-k 
task. 
All sessions were conducted at the University of East Anglia. The experiment was completely 
computerised and was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 244 subjects participated in 
our four main treatments (61 in each) and 58 subjects participated in the Baseline. 
Experimental earnings were calculated in points and were converted to Pounds at the rate of 
200 points to £1. Subjects were able to collect their earnings at their convenience on the day 
in which they participated. The average subject spent about 60 minutes in the lab and earned 
£13.45 including a £2 show-up fee. 
4. Results 
Figure 1 gives the performance on each task for each treatment for each individual, arranged 
in ascending order based on performance in task 1. It also disaggregates performance by the 
High and Low groups in each treatment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Individual performance on each task by reference group and treatment   
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Individual Performance High Group
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Five features stand out in Figure 1 in relation to our questions.  
1) Almost everyone’s performance improves in Task 2.  
2) The boost is particularly marked among the very lowest performers on Task 1 (that is 
the lowest 10 performing subjects in each Treatment).   
3) There is no marked difference with respect to 1) and 2) between High and Low 
groups. 
4) There is no marked difference with respect to 1) and 2) across Treatments with the 
possible exception of Delegation in relation to 2) where there are also some very low 
performers on task 1 whose performance on task 2 actually worsens. 
5) The boost is greatest in the Free Choice treatment 
1) is supported by Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the aggregate performance on Task 2 as 
compared with Task 1: it is significantly different from 0 (p < 0.01) for each group in each 
Treatment.  1) is also supported by individual level regressions on performance in each task 
in Table 1. The task 2 dummy is significant and positive in all cases. This regression also 
disaggregates by screen number on each task to test whether boredom or experience is 
generating a time trend in performance that could complicate the interpretation of the 
apparent boost to individual performance. The only significant time trends in task 1 are in the 
Random treatment, where it is negative, and in the High Baseline, where it is positive; and, in 
task 2 under Delegation, where it is negative. The negative time trend in task 1 for Random 
reinforces the conclusion that there is a jump in task 2 because in so far as the time taken on 
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task 1 had been increased and apparent boredom had continued to reduce performance, then 
the jump on task 2 would have been even bigger. The time trend in Delegation works in the 
opposite direction. If boredom had continued to affect performance then a longer period on 
both tasks would have reduced the boost to performance in task 2 in this treatment. The 
positive time trend in task 1 for the High Baseline would for the same reason suggest that the 
boost in task 2 would have appeared smaller had learning continued over a longer time period 
in task 1.11 
Table 1. Individual performance on each screen (Random effects model) 
 
  
High 
Baseline 
Low 
Baseline 
Random Free Choice Paid Choice Delegation 
Task 2 4.119*** 3.447*** 1.981*** 4.638*** 4.037*** 3.738*** 
 
(0.804) (1.012) (0.622) (0.715) (0.586) (0.634) 
 
      
Screen # in Task 1 0.366*** 0.018 -0.379** 0.034 0.168 0.064 
 
(0.125) (0.209) (0.175) (0.139) (0.114) (0.122) 
 
      
Screen # in Task 2 0.040 -0.009 -0.113 -0.027 -0.087 -0.252** 
 
(0.154) (0.167) (0.110) (0.073) (0.106) (0.120) 
 
      
Constant 30.913*** 16.867*** 29.65*** 4.801 27.68*** 13.79** 
 
(5.626) (5.772) (5.548) (7.038) (8.238) (7.004) 
 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 464 464 976 976 976 976 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each screen. Standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses. 
 
Result 1: After controlling for possible learning/boredom, individual performance on 
Task 2 is greater than Task 1 in all Treatments. Had the time spent on each task been 
increased, the significant positive/negative time trend in Task1/Task 2 in the 
Baseline(High)/Delegation treatments could qualify this result for these treatments. 
To examine whether the boost to performance in Task 2 differs when there are two group 
reference points rather than one, we compare the boost for those in the Baseline High group 
                                                        
11 We also controlled for the possibility that learning might occur discretely between task 1 and task 2 rather 
than on screen-by-screen basis (or that individuals simply wanted to do better on task 2 than task 1) by running a 
further baseline control where there were no group affiliations. The results are reported in the electronic 
appendix. Performance on task 2 was significantly higher than on task 1, but the boost was significantly lower 
(between one half and one third) than in all our Treatments experiments and than in the Low group version of 
the Baseline.  
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with that achieved by the High group in the Random Treatment; and analogously the boost in 
Baseline Low group with the boost in the Low group in the Random Treatment. The 
corresponding Mann-Whitney tests reveal no significant difference for either the High group 
or the Low group affiliation (p = 0.837 and p = 0.462, respectively). 
Result 2: There is no difference in the boost to average performance in Task 2 
between the Baseline Treatment (single group reference) and the Random treatment 
(two group reference points with random allocation).  
There is no significant difference in the boost between High and Low groups in a Wilcoxon 
test (p = 0.1882).  This result is robust across treatments (Random: p = 0.6431; Free Choice: 
p = 0.3638; Paid Choice: p = 0.8356; Delegation: p = 0.4735). Individual task regressions 
yield the same conclusion: the group affiliation dummy is never significant. 
Result 3: There is no evidence that the boost to performance in Task 2 is different for 
those affiliated to the High group as compared with those in the Low group.  
We next consider whether individual behaviour converges to the own group norm. If the 
effect of social information is to encourage higher performance by all individuals, then those 
who were performing below the group norm will appear to converge towards the group norm 
for this reason. So for these individuals behaviour motivated by convergence to the norm is 
indistinguishable from behaviour aimed at improving performance. The two types of 
behaviour pull in opposite directions for those who were originally performing above their 
group average (on Task 1) and so they are the individuals to consider for this purpose. Table 
2 disaggregates between those who were initially above/below their respective group norms 
on Task 1 and performs a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to see in which direction the 
performance boost is significant for each type of subject. Although the performance boost is 
typically lower for those who performed above the norm on Task 1, the change in Task 2 is 
still very clearly positive (and of similar magnitude for those in the Low as those in the High 
groups and this is what we also find in the analogous individual regressions). 
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Table 2. Means and Tests for zero performance boost by initial performance relative to 
norm 
 
All  Below the norm after Task 1 
Above the norm after 
Task 1 
 
Mean 
Task 1 
Mean 
Task 2 
Obs 
Mean  
Boost 
z [p] Obs 
Mean 
Boost 
z [p] 
All groups 128.418 154.069 138 29.659 8.328 106 20.434 8.358 
  (45.103) (41.690) 
 
(41.251) [0.0000] 
 
(15.611) [0.0000] 
  
 
  
  
  
   
High 
groups 
  
132.985 156.759 104 24.74 7.276 25 19.76 4.253 
(46.664) (42.688) 
 
(38.352) [0.0000] 
 
(12.81) [0.0000] 
  
 
  
  
  
   
Low 
groups 
  
123.296 151.052 34 44.706 4.335 81 20.642 7.247 
(42.909) (40.515)   (46.516) [0.0000]   (16.446) [0.0000] 
Column All includes aggregate mean performance in Task 1 and Task 2. The other columns present the mean of 
the difference in individual performance (Task 2 – Task 1). Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. The 
last column presents test-statistics [p-values] for Wilcoxon sign rank tests for Difference = 0. 
 
 
Result 4: There is no evidence that those whose performance in Task 1 is above the 
norm in their group conform to this norm either by not increasing or by reducing 
their performance in Task 2.  
Nevertheless, Table 2 suggests that the variance in performance falls in Task 2 as compared 
with that in Task 1 (standard deviation across all groups falls from 45.1 to 41.69) and this 
occurs because low performers on Task 1 improve by more than the high ones in both groups.  
The marked improvement by the particularly poor performers on task 1 was also evident in 
Figure 1. We test for this formally in the regression that is reported in Table 3. We divide 
performance in Task 1 into four interval groups and introduce these as dummies interacted 
with task 2 into the individual performance regression: Upper = 171 and above; Upper 
Middle = (171, 139]; Lower Middle= (138, 108]; and Lower =107 and below. The omitted 
dummy in this equation is Lower and so the coefficients on the other interval dummies 
capture the difference with respect to those in these intervals and the Lower interval group. 
We find that there is no difference among the coefficients on the Upper, Upper Middle and 
Lower Middle dummies interacted with Task 2 (p > 0.10 for all pairwise post-regression 
tests) and they are significant and negative in all Treatments except Delegation. This suggests 
that the boost in task 2 for individuals in these intervals is significantly less than that of 
individuals in the Lower interval on Task 1 in all Treatments except Delegation.  
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Table 3. Individual performance by interval groups on Task 1 (Random effects model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Random Free choice Paid choice Delegation 
Task 2 49.68*** 49.07*** 63.05*** 43.75*** 38.08*** 
 (6.230) (12.84) (13.46) (11.11) (13.84) 
      
Upper 117.4*** 112.1*** 118.1*** 141.7*** 109.2*** 
 (5.173) (7.445) (10.80) (11.80) (12.00) 
      
Upper-middle 85.68*** 76.01*** 84.93*** 99.33*** 87.39*** 
 (4.740) (6.481) (9.618) (10.32) (12.03) 
      
Lower-middle 57.71*** 57.56*** 57.45*** 66.13*** 56.14*** 
 (4.727) (6.552) (9.340) (10.99) (11.48) 
      
Upper -30.68*** -35.37** -42.30*** -20.25* -22.83 
In Task 2 (6.726) (14.04) (13.73) (11.96) (16.22) 
      
Upper-middle -32.94*** -29.07** -43.41*** -30.07*** -24.74 
In Task 2 (6.512) (13.05) (13.97) (11.40) (15.30) 
      
Lower-middle -32.17*** -31.07** -37.00*** -31.32** -24.65* 
In Task 2 (6.903) (14.78) (14.10) (13.63) (14.97) 
      
Constant 82.84*** 134.8*** 59.14** 57.70 27.81 
 (16.45) (30.82) (23.33) (35.76) (37.83) 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 122 122 122 122 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each task, leading to two observations per individual. Standard errors 
clustered on subject in parentheses. 
 
Result 5: The very lowest performers (i.e. those below 108) in Task 1 increase their 
performance on Task 2 by significantly more than other individuals, except in the 
Delegation Treatment. 
Finally we examine whether the boost varies across treatments. The Wilcoxon test for 
aggregate differences suggests it is higher under Free Choice than Paid Choice and 
Delegation at 10% level (p = 0.072 and p = 0.090, respectively). Figure 1 points to 
considerable individual variation in these boosts and so we also test for differences through 
Treatment dummies interacted with Task 2 in the individual performance regressions in Table 
4. The omitted Treatment dummy is for Random. Focusing on the All column, the coefficient 
on Free Choice interacted with Task 2 is positive and significantly different at the 10% level 
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from the omitted Treatment dummy (Random) and it is higher than the other Treatment 
dummy interacts (which are not significantly different from zero). The difference with the 
other Treatment interact dummies is significant in both cases (p = 0.0494 for Paid Choice and 
p = 0.0105 for Delegation). 
Table 4. Individual performance with Treatment dummies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Groups High Groups Low Groups 
Task 2 25.21*** 20.36*** 29.33*** 
 (3.784) (4.747) (5.789) 
    
Free Choice -13.46 -0.233 -19.85* 
 (7.960) (11.81) (10.23) 
    
Paid Choice -3.214 -4.521 -5.094 
 (8.269) (9.276) (13.75) 
    
Delegation -7.819 -17.41* 1.915 
 (7.216) (9.352) (10.07) 
    
Free Choice 10.20* 13.31 7.461 
in Task 2 (6.192) (9.085) (8.715) 
    
Paid Choice -2.000 3.399 -7.233 
in Task 2 (5.367) (7.143) (7.312) 
    
Delegation -6.443 -1.751 -10.37 
in Task 2 (5.707) (8.501) (7.367) 
    
Constant 169.4*** 192.7*** 129.6*** 
 (26.95) (38.65) (37.98) 
    
Controls? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 258 230 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dep. variable: Individual Performance on each task. Standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses. 
 
After regression (2), no treatment differences.  
After regression (3), Free vs. Paid, p = 0.0628; Free vs. Delegation, p = 0.0249. 
 
Result 6: The boost to performance on Task 2 is higher under Free Choice than in the 
other Treatments, and most clearly when compared with Paid Choice and Delegation.  
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4. Discussion 
These results, taken at face value, are important. They have, for instance, 3 implications for 
policy. First, a social information policy ‘nudge’ appears generally attractive. It boosts 
individual performance similarly in multiple group settings as when there is a single 
reference group; and there is no adverse effect on inequality.12 Indeed, individual inequality 
falls because the biggest boosts are among the low individual performers. Second, 
notwithstanding this general encouragement, a policy maker has to be aware of how group 
reference points are generated because the effects are not the same. They are weakest when 
group affiliation occurs through a mechanism of ‘delegated choice’. Third, the policy of 
promoting consumer choice in the provision of public services needs careful assessment 
when accompanied by social information because much of its effects may be coming from 
the social information ‘nudge’. 
They are also new because multiple group social information has typically not been examined 
experimentally. The evidence on social information ‘nudges’ comes from single group 
reference points, yet in many natural settings there are multiple groups. Although this means 
there are no direct cross checks with the other experiments in the literature, there are points of 
comparison. 13  For instance, the boost to performance in our experiment with a single 
reference group (17.2%) is similar to that found in Azmat and Iriberri (2012) when there is a 
single reference group and a piece rate payment system (=17.3%) and Falk and Ichino (2006) 
when there is a single group and a flat payment (=16.3%). Neither of these comparator 
experiments allowed a statistical test of whether this performance boost was related to 
performance prior to the provision of a group reference point because both rely on between 
subject comparisons. Nevertheless, there is some suggestion in Falk and Ichino (2006) that, in 
the same way as we find, the biggest boosts occurred among low performers. This is 
consistent with what also appears to be the case in the Mas and Moretti (2009) experiment 
with respect to poor initial performers and it is a stronger result with respect to the good 
                                                        
12 The boost from the social information nudge in this context is particularly interesting because this is a real 
effort task where there is evidence that material incentives have little effect on performance (see De Araujo et 
al, 2015). 
13 Although we have not reported it here as part of the results, there is evidence in our experiment of the Falk 
and Knell(2004) prediction that, in effect, people will choose their groups associatively: that is high/low 
performers choose the High/Low group (see electronic appendix for details). More generally, this suggests 
group affiliation matters for our subjects in this experiment (and so plausibly motivates them even though the 
groups are minimal, otherwise there would be no reason to expect the choice of group to be other than random.  
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performers (= above average in their study). It is also consistent with the findings of some 
peer group studies (see Carrell et al., 2009).  
5. Conclusion 
There is evidence that the provision of social information, a group performance reference 
point, affects individual performance positively and so can act as policy ‘nudge’. What is not 
known from the existing literature is whether the effects on individual behaviour are similar 
when there are multiple, exclusive groups. This is an important gap because many group 
reference points naturally arise in a context where there is more than one group and whether 
there are one or many group reference points is itself often a policy choice. It is also not clear 
from the existing experimental literature whether the provision of group reference points 
affects not only average performance but also the inequality of performance across the 
population. This is important because policy makers often care about both average 
performance and its individual variability across the population. Our experiment addresses 
both issues. In addition, it examines whether the mechanism generating group affiliation, 
itself often a policy choice, affects the influence of such social comparisons. 
We find that a social information ‘nudge’ with multiple groups boosts average performance 
by a similar amount to a single group ‘nudges’. We also find individual inequality usually 
falls and group inequality is unchanged. In particular, individuals who initially perform 
among the worst produce the biggest boost in performance after the provision of the group 
reference points. The exception to this conclusion is that the boost among the very weakest 
performers does not occur when group affiliation is generated through a form of Delegated 
choice. There is also some evidence that the boost to average performance is weakest in these 
circumstances too. In contrast, we find that the average boost is generally largest when group 
affiliation is freely chosen.  
In short, a social information ‘nudge’, judged in these respects, appears rather attractive but 
its attraction does depend on how group affiliation is generated. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
Thanks for taking part in this experiment. 
 
You are the only person booked to start at this time. 
 
You will be paid £2 for turning up plus whatever you earn in the experiment. The experiment 
requires you to perform 5 independent tasks. Further instructions will be given before each 
task. You can earn points in each task. You will be told how many points you obtained in 
each task at the end of the experiment. These points will then be converted into cash at a rate 
of £1 per 200 points. More instructions about how to collect your money will be provided at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
To begin task 1, press OK. 
 
TASK 1 
 
You will see a series of screens. Every 2 minutes a new screen will appear. In each screen, 
you will see 48 sliders. Each slider has values from 0 to 100. Each slider will appear at 
position 0. The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the 
current position is displayed to the right of each slider. 
 
Your task is to position each slider at exactly 50 with your mouse. You get 5 points per each 
slider you have positioned at 50.Suppose you position 5 sliders at exactly 50 then you will 
earn 25 points. 
 
After 16 minutes, you will automatically be taken to the next task. You can also choose to 
move on to the next task at any time before the 16 minutes. This is done by clicking on the 
`next task´ button at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Before you start this task, there will be a 2 minute practice screen. 
 
Quiz before Task 1 (after practice screen): 
1. Choose the correct one:  
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for every slider I move 
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
 I will not be paid for this task 
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 10 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
2. I can move to the next task: 
 at the end of 16 minutes 
 when I press the `next task´ button 
 either of the above 
 after 2 minutes 
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TASK 2 
 
Your task is, again, to position sliders at exactly 50 with your mouse. 
 
Random Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you will be affiliated randomly either 
with a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group.  
 
Free Choice Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you must choose a group affiliation. 
You can be affiliated with either a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
 
Paid Choice Treatment: Before you can carry out the task, you must choose a group 
affiliation. But there is a fee of 100 points for the affiliation. You can be affiliated with either 
a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
 
Delegation Treatment: Before you carry out the task, you must select a person to determine 
your group affiliation. There are four people, numbered 1-4, who have chosen an affiliation 
for someone else. The choice of the person you select will determine your affiliation. You 
can be affiliated with either a `high performance´ or a `low performance´ group. 
 
This affiliation will NOT affect the points per slider that you get by positioning the slider at 
exactly 50: that is you get 5 points per slider. On average, members of the `high performance´ 
group position 171 sliders at exactly 50 and members of the `low performance´ group 
position 108 sliders at exactly 50. 
 
Remember that you will have a maximum of 16 minutes to carry out your task this time. 
Every 2 minutes a new screen with sliders will appear. In each screen, you will see 48 sliders 
as before. Each slider has values from 0 to 100. Each slider will appear at position 0. The 
slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the current position is 
displayed to the right of each slider; and you get 5 points per each slider you have positioned 
at 50. 
 
After 16 minutes, you will automatically be taken to the next task. You can also choose to 
move on to the next task at any time before the 16 minutes. This is done by clicking on the 
`next task´ button at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Quiz before Task2: 
1. Choose the correct one:  
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for every slider I move 
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn more money for each correctly position slider if I am in the `high performance´ 
group 
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 5 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
 I will not be paid for this task 
 The slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and I will 
earn 10 points for each slider that it is positioned at 50 before the time runs out 
2. I can move to the next task: 
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 at the end of 16 minutes 
 when I press the `next task´ button 
 either of the above 
 after 2 minutes 
3. Choose the correct one:  
Random Treatment: 
 I will be assigned to a group depending on my previous performance 
 I can choose any group 
 I will be assigned randomly to a group 
Free Choice Treatment: 
 I should choose the group exclusively depending on my previous performance 
 I will be assigned randomly to a group 
 I can choose any group 
Paid Choice Treatment: 
 I should choose the group exclusively depending on my previous performance 
 I have to pay a fee and I will be assigned randomly to a group 
 I can choose any group but I have to pay a fee 
Delegation Treatment: 
 I can choose the groups from 1 to 4 
 I will be assigned randomly to a group by choosing a number from 1 to 4 
 I must select a person from 1 to 4 and that person will determine the group 
 
Group choice/assignment before Task 2: 
There are two groups `high performance´ (average: 171) and `low performance´ (average: 
108). 
  
Random Treatment: You have been randomly assigned to group `high performance´ or `low 
performance´ 
 
 
Free Choice Treatment: Which group do you choose?  
 high performance  
 low performance 
Paid Choice Treatment: This choice will cost you 100 points. Which group do you choose?  
 high performance  
 low performance 
 
Delegation Treatment: You must select a person to determine your group affiliation. Which 
person do you select to determine your group affiliation?  
1  2  3  4 
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Person <person choice> had selected `high performance´ <or `low performance´>. 
 
Information displayed on the top of the screen in all treatments:  
Your group is high performance <or low performance>. In 16 minutes, people correctly 
positioned, on average, 171 sliders in the high performance group and 108 sliders in the low 
performance group. 
 
Currently, the number of correctly positioned sliders is: 
 
TASK 3 
 
You now need to make 10 decisions for each of four successive computer screens. Each 
decision is a paired choice between two options (for example, "Option A" and "Option B"). 
You will make ten decisions and record these in the final column, but only one of them from 
each computer screen will be used in the end to determine your earnings. You will only know 
which one at the end of the experiment. 
 
Before you start making your ten choices, please let us explain how these decisions will 
affect your earnings for this part of the experiment. After you have made all of your 
decisions, the computer will randomly select which of the ten decisions will be used to 
determine your earnings. In relation to this decision, the computer will then randomly select 
the outcome based on the probabilities assigned to the option you chose.  
 
As an example, assume that, for the randomly selected decision, the option to the left pays 
100 points with a 10% chance and 50 points with a 90% chance, while the option to the right 
pays 80 points with a 20% chance and 45 points with a 80% chance. Assume that you chose 
the option to the left for this decision; then there is a 10% chance that will earn 100 points 
and a 90% chance that you will earn 50 points. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
Information displayed on the top of the screen in all treatments:  
Risk Aversion screen: No information displayed.  
 
Ambiguity Aversion screen: ?% chance means that you do not know how likely each 
outcome is. Two unknown probabilities add up to 100%. 
 
Loss Aversion screen: You will lose points in this period. 
 
Conformism screen: It would be nice if some of you were to choose Option __ . 
TASK 4 
 
In this task, you will be given 100 points for answering a hypothetical question.  
 
Imagine that you have been given a job. The same job has been given to another person. Both 
of you have the same skills and qualifications for the job. You completed the job in 10 hours. 
The other person completed the job in 7 hours and was paid £42. 
 
In your opinion, what would be the fairest amount for you to be paid (between £0 and £100)?  
Submit your suggestion: ______ 
27 
 
 
TASK 5 
 
There will be many people participating in today´s experiment. You will be randomly 
matched with one of them. Neither of you will be told who the other participant is. Both of 
you receive the same instructions: 
 
Each of you must choose a number between 11 and 20 (decimals are not allowed). Each of 
you will receive an amount of points 10 times the number you have chosen.  
 
A participant will receive an additional 200 points if he or she chooses a number that is 
exactly one less than the number that the other participant has chosen. 
 
Quiz before Task 5: 
Choose the correct one:  
 The amount of points I earn is the number I choose times 10 and if I choose exactly 
one number lower than the other person, I will be paid 200 extra points 
 The amount of points I earn is the number I choose times 10 
 If I do not choose a lower number than the other person, I will not earn anything 
 
Choose your number: _____ 
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Appendix B: Additional Analysis 
Table B1. Mean performance 
 
 
N Task 1 Task 2 Difference 
Random affiliation 61 137.344 162.557 25.21312*** 
Free choice 61 121.049 156.459 35.40984*** 
Paid choice 61 129.361 152.574 23.21312*** 
Delegation 61 125.918 144.689 18.77049*** 
Only high group 29 153.655 175.448 21.7931*** 
Only low group 29 126.724 153.207 26.48276*** 
No Reference 25 144.96 158.32 13.36*** 
The *** indicate that, in all treatments, the boost in performance in Task 2 is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
p-values for Mann-Whitney tests comparing the difference (increase in effort in Task 2) 
between the No ref treatment and the other treatments:  
 
1. Random: p = 0.0114 
2. Free Choice: p = 0.0014 
3. Paid Choice: p = 0.0752 
4. Delegation: p = 0.0912 
5. Only High reference: p = 0.1990  
6. Only Low reference: p = 0.0200 
 
 
 
Table B2. Group choice and performance on task 1 
 
Performance 
Class in Task 1 
Free group choice Paid group choice 
Low High 
Associative 
choosing Low High 
Associative 
choosing 
Upper 0 8     0.000*** 3 9     0.047** 
Upper-Middle 8 6     0.605 2 17     0.001*** 
Lower-middle 13 7     0.057* 9 5     0.090* 
Lower 13 6     0.032* 6 10     0.773 
Total 34 27 
 
20 41 
  
Note: The column Associative choosing indicate the level of significance of a binomial test for is the 
hypothesis of a probability equal to 0.5 versus the alternative of associative choosing (i.e. Upper classes 
favor high group and Lower classes favor low group) where *** is at 1%, ** at 5% and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
